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Abortion Rights in America 
Joan R. Bullock* 
In the United States, a trend is emerging where "freedom 
of choice" is used to c o ~ o t e  "freedom from responsibility." 
However, responsibility is required for the fruitful exercise of 
any freedom. In order to  act responsibly, one must give due 
consideration to  the consequences of various courses of action 
and be willing to accept the consequences flowing from the 
chosen action. Freedom of choice, therefore, should not be 
interpreted as the freedom to remove oneself from the 
consequences of one's own actions. Unfortunately, when it 
comes to the issue of abortion, many individuals interpret 
freedom of choice as exactly that-the freedom from accepting 
the consequences of one's actions.' It should be noted at the 
outset that this "freedom of choice" is exercised not only by 
women but also by men who support or urge their wives or 
significant others to have abortions in order that they too can 
be free from accepting the consequences of their actions.' 
Each of us, while growing up, was given more freedom as 
we matured. This was a sign that our parents, or other care 
providers, believed that we were mature enough, not so much 
to enjoy the freedom, but more to handle the responsibilities 
that came with the freedom. It was important that our 
maturity evidenced our ability to accept responsibility for the 
consequences of our actions. If we were later found unable to 
guide ourselves responsibly while exploring the limits of our 
newfound freedom, it was taken away until we matured 
sufficiently to again convince our care providers that we were 
indeed worthy of that desired freedom. This was done to teach 
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1. See inF& note 17 and accompanying text. 
2. See infra note 8 and accompanying text. 
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us that true freedom requires responsible action and that ir- 
responsible action or carelessness towards that freedom would 
eventually enslave us by the dangers latent in experiencing 
that freed~m.~ 
Now that we are adults making our voices heard in society, 
many of us have lost sight of this simple but important lesson 
of life. Instead, we engage in self-justifying rhetoric in order to 
enjoy (and abuse) our freedom while we shun the consequences 
of our actions. Such self-justification can be found in the 
rhetoric of many who view abortion as a viable alternative to  
traditional methods of birth control. It is true that restricting 
abortions can place an ominous burden on women; but it need 
not be so. The mere fact that only women can biologically give 
birth does not make childbearing and childrearing solely a 
woman's issue. Instead, it is, and should be, a societal issue, in 
which men should play a major role. 
It is interesting to note that while men revelled in the 
sexual freedom gained from the "sexual revolution" of the 
1960s, there emerged a new underclass of poverty largely 
comprised of women and children4 More women are having 
children with no financial or other support from men;5 divorces 
are increasing at an alarming rate6 with many women being 
3. For example, one should not drive an automobile without first 
understanding the operation of the vehicle and having an appreciation of the 
dangers inherent in driving. Further, an individual should not have the freedom to 
, 
drink alcoholic beverages until one has the capacity to understand the effect of 
alcohol on one's body and an appreciation of the dangers to oneself and to others 
when too much alcohol is consumed. Lastly, one should not decide to have children 
unless there is first an appreciation of the responsibility required to raise children 
properly. 
4. In her critique of individualism, Elizabeth Fox-Genovese noted that the 
shift from communitarianism to individualism has resulted in disadvantaging 
women who had previously been cared for by social institutions, such as marriage, 
leaving them with the empty notion of individualism with no substantive 
liberation. ELIZAEIETH FOX-GENOVESE, FEMINISM WITHOUT IILUSIONS 40-41 (1991). 
5. Mlore than a third of all noneustodial parents (usually fathers) ignore 
the obligation to support their children, and many others pay only a 
fraction of what they owe. Only one single parent in four receives the 
full amount of court-ordered child support . . . . 
This is not because most fathers cannot pay. . . . But they do not 
feel a sense of personal responsibility for th&-children . . . . 
NATIONAL COMM'N ON CHILDREN, BEYOND RKETORIC: A NEW AMERICAN AGENDA 
FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, SUMMARY, FINAL REPORT 30 (1991) (footnote omitted). 
6. William J. Goode, World Changes in Divorce Patterns, in ECONOMIC 
CONSEQUENCES OF DIVORCE: THE INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 11, 13, 16, 22 
(Lenore J. Weitzman & Mavis Maclean eds., 1992). 
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forced to become the sole providers for their families.' These 
facts support the notion that society, and particularly men, are 
shifting the burden of responsible action, i.e., the foreplanning 
and the responsibilities inherent in raising children, onto 
women? To make matters worse, those who embrace the 
abortion rights argument subscribe to  this line of thinking. 
Implicit in the argument of those who view abortion rights only 
in terms of the right of the woman to her own body, with men 
having no role in the abortion decision, is the assumption that 
childbearing and childrearing are issues that concern only 
women. They commit to the woman alone responsibility for 
handling these issues. 
The purpose of this Article is not to relegate women to 
reproductive enslavement; rather, the purpose of this Article is 
to  raise the question of whether abortion is an answer to the 
numerous inequalities that confront many women when there 
is an unwanted pregnancy, or whether abortion exacerbates the 
inequalities by encouraging the subordination of women to 
men. There is the additional question of whether the judicial 
system is the appropriate forum for deciding the abortion 
issue-an issue that invokes high emotions and one that is 
fraught with deeply held and divergent moral convictions. It is 
my opinion that abortion has provided women with only an 
illusion of choice rather than meaningful choice because the 
societal value systems currently in place devalue and oppress 
women. 
7. A handful of recent studies . . . have begun to map out the 
contours of divorce settlements in the no-fault era. . . . These studies 
indicate in general a decrease in every facet of women's settlements 
as compared with settlements under fault regimes. Alimony is granted 
less frequently, in smaller amounts, and for shorter durations. 
Similarly, child support awards shrank in size and were granted less 
often. Women also received smaller shares of the family assets and 
greater shares of the family debt. 
James B. McLindon, Separate but Unequal: The Economic Disaster of Divorce for 
Women and Children, 21 FAM. L.Q. 351, 352 (1987) (footnotes omitted). 
The . . . data [from another study] . . . reinforces the conclusion drawn 
by other researchers that a woman's chance of becoming poor increases 
greatly after divorce. . . . Economically, the father's standard of living 
increases dramatically after the divorce . . . . 
Id. at 394-95. 
8. "Many men support women's right to abortion because they perceive that 
if women believe that they can engage in intercourse without having to accept an 
unwanted pregnancy, they will become more sexually available." SUSAN SHERWIN, 
NO LONGER PATIENT: FEMINIST ETHICS AND HEALTH CARE 115 (1992). 
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The divergent, deeply held convictions manifested by our 
pluralistic society dictate that justice would be better served by 
attempting to resolve the abortion issue via the legislative 
process rather than by judicial fiat. Notwithstanding Roe v. 
Wade,' there has never been a consensus of approval for 
providing women with a n  unrestricted right to abort their 
unborn. As Justice Scalia remarked in Webster v. Reproductive 
Health Services,'' 
[The Court has awarded itself] sovereignty over a field where 
i t  has little proper business since the answers to most of the 
cruel questions posed are political and not juridical-a 
sovereignty which therefore quite properly, but to the great 
damage of the Court, makes it the object of the sort of 
organized public pressure that political institutions in a 
democracy ought to receive." 
The legislative system is better equipped to wrangle with the 
differing views in order to produce a result which, although not 
receiving uniform consensus, can provide the populace with a 
sense that each view was considered and represented in  
reaching the result. 
11. THE RATIONALE FOR ABORTION 
Over 1.5 million abortions are performed in the United 
States every year.12 In 1988, Aida Torres and Jacqueline 
Forrest asked 1900 women to explain why they had an 
abortion. Of the women surveyed, arguably over 70% had used 
abortion as a method of birth control.13 Fewer than 1% of all 
abortions are performed because the pregnancy was the result 
of rape or incest." Although the reasons why women who 
were not victims of rape or incest or whose lives were not 
9. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
10. 492 U.S. 490 (1989). 
11. Id. at 532 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
12. THE ALAN G ~ M A C H E R  INSTFTUTE, FACTS IN BRIEF: ABORTION IN THE 
UNITED STATES 1 (1993) [hereinafter FACTS]. 7.n 1988, there were 1.6 million 
abortions in the United States. From 1973 through 1988, more than 22 million 
legal abortions took place in the United States. Since 1967, when many states 
began liberalizing their abortion laws, almost 24 million legal abortions have been 
performed." Id. 
13. See Aida Torres & Jacqueline D. Forrest, Why Do W o r n  Have 
Abortions?, 20 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 169, 169-70, 176 (1988). 
14. In 1988, only 16,000 of the 1.6 million abortions occurred as a result of 
rape or incest. FACTS, supra note 12, at 1. 
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threatened by pregnancy chose to have an abortion varied, the 
majority were concerned about how a baby would change their 
lives, whether they were ready for the responsibility, whether 
others would discover they had had sex or were pregnant, and 
whether the relationship they were in was stable.15 Further, 
statistics published by The Alan Guttmacher Institute indicate 
that, of the total number of pregnancies among American 
women, 50% are unintended and 50% of that number are 
terminated by abortion.16 These statistics, coupled with the 
reasons women have abortions, suggest that there is either 
inadequate foreplanning or a lack of concern for the conse- 
quences of sexual activity." Although the abovementioned 
reasons are valid, these are important concerns both women 
and men should sincerely consider before engaging in sexual 
activity. Doing so is the beginning of responsible action. 
Among developed countries, the United States has one of 
the higher abortion rates.'' In fact, it has been estimated that 
the rates of abortion and unintended pregnancy in the United 
States are about five times those of the Netherlands.'' With 
such alarming statistics of unintended pregnancies and the 
high number of abortions, it is this author's conclusion that the 
availability of abortion and its ease of procurement have 
discouraged women and men from engaging in responsible 
action such as foreplanning, traditional birth control methods 
and abstinen~e.~' These high numbers reflect an emerging 
value system where individuals shun responsibility for their 
actions and society lacks concern for the plight of its individual 
members. 
In 1921, Margaret Sanger, the founder of the forerunner to  
Planned Parenthood, stressed the importance of responsible 
action, stating: 
15. Torres & Forrest, supra note 13, at  170. 
16. FACTS, supra note 12, a t  1. 
17. "The level of unintended pregnancy is in part a reflection of poor 
contraceptive practice among American women." Torres & Forrest, supra note 13, 
at  176 (citation omitted). 
18. FACTS, supra note 12, a t  1. 
19. Id. 
20. "The available data . . . indicate that abortion has . . . become a primary 
method of birth control. . . . By providing unrestricted access to abortion 
throughout the first six months of pregnancy, Roe (and now Casgr) discourage 
women and men from exercising sexual responsibility." Steven R. Hemler, Richard 
G. Wilkins & Frank H. Fischer, Abortion: A PrincipZed Politics, NATX REV., Dec. 
27, 1993, at  40, 41. 
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Responsible sex-action requires forethought, and 
irresponsible action is immoral. Every civilization involves an 
increasing forethought for others, even for those unborn. The 
reckless abandonment of the moment and the careless regard 
for the consequences, is not morality. . . . Nature's way of 
reducing her numbers is controlled by disease and famine. 
Primitive man achieved the same results by infanticide, 
abandonment of children, or abortion . . . 
Discounting this concern for responsible sex-action, some 
argue that abortions must remain legal so as not to enslave 
women via their bodies.22 This argument plays upon the 
sympathies of the American public by parading images of 
women who are subjected to rape and incest and who then will 
be further traumatized by being forced t o  carry an unwanted 
child to term? These sympathies also embrace the poor 
women who, through no choice of their own as to their 
economic circumstances, will be forced to b ~ g  more children 
into the world, serving only to stretch the circle of poverty and 
increase the burden on the national welfare system? 
21. MADELINE GRAY, MARGARET SANGER: A BIOGRAPHY OF THE CHAMPION OF 
BIRTH CONTROL 174 (1979). 
22. [Tlhose who would outlaw abortion . . . would rely upon economic and 
physiological circumstances-the supposed dictates of the natural-to 
conscript women . . . as involuntary incubators and thus to usurp a 
control over sexual activity and its consequences that men . . . take 
for granted. To one who regards this outcome as unjust, a right to 
end pregnancy might be seen more plausibly as a matter of resisting 
sexual and economic domination than as a matter of shielding from 
public control "private" transactions . . . . 
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 243 (1985). 
Although there may be some injustice in requiring women to bear the children 
they conceive, it is important to comment that it is not the unborn child who has 
caused the injustice. It is my opinion that to get rid of the root of the injustice, 
the cultural value system which, to paraphrase Mr. Tribe, allows men to engage in 
sexual activity and take for granted its consequences, must be dismantled. See 
infia notes 106-109 and accompanying text. 
23. But, as noted, supra note 14 and accompanying text, rape and incest 
account for fewer than 1% of all abortions. 
24. It has been argued that making abortions illegal would only make them 
so for the poor and that the rich would continue to have abortions. 123 CONG. 
REC. 1991 (1977) (statement of Sen. Garn), adapted and reprinted in Jake Garn, 
An American Standard, HUM. LIFE REV., Spring 1977, at 43, 44. However, as 
Senator Jake Garn indicated in his address to the Senate in 1977, in support of 
two life-protecting constitutional amendments, what the rich are able to do is 
irrelevant. Id., adapted and reprinted in Garn, supra, at 44. "This country cannot 
predicate its laws upon the practices of the wealthy, particularly when such 
practices deprive humans of their lives. 'Equal justice under law' does not mean 
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Realities bear out, however, that women are already 
enslaved--enslaved by an ideology which thrives on self- 
centered, competitive superiority to the exclusion and demise of 
others and which is buttressed by moral decay. For example, 
why are women subjected to rape and incest? Why is there a 
tendency in rape laws to hold the woman responsible for the 
crime committed against her by putting her on trial for being 
raped?25 Further, why are women without economic 
opportunities such that their only "logical" choice is to abort? 
Why is there not a better system in place to force non-custodial 
fathers to pay for the rearing of their children? These questions 
point to the real enslavement of women. Our culture's ideology 
of self-centered, competitive superiority uses domination and 
oppression to enslave women. If women want true "freedom of 
choice," then the use of abortion to counteract "reproductive 
enslavement" is not the answer. 
It is the author's opinion that the availability and the ease 
of procurement of abortion as a method of birth control 
encourages the irresponsible action of both men and 
which leads to this "enslavement." Abortion allows many men 
to perceive women as more available for them sexually.27 
Moreover, men are socialized to use sex to oppress women and 
women are socialized to be ~ompliant.~' This cultural value 
system perpetuates the true "reproductive enslavement" of 
women. The use of abortion may eliminate some of the 
symptom of oppression through "reproductive enslavement" 
but it does not eliminate the oppression. Permitting women to 
use abortion as a method of birth control encourages women to 
embrace this same ideology of self-centered, competitive 
superiority when it comes to the rights of the fetus. 
The dangers of such an ideology have been manifest in the 
past. Semantics and legal rationalizations were employed to 
nullify the rights of others and justify the enslavement of 
African-Americans,Zg the killing of Jews:' and countless 
that legislatures and courts must legitimize the foibles, attitudes, and evils of the 
rich." Garn, supra, at 44. 
25. See Report of the Missouri Task Force on Gender and Justice, 58 Mo. L. 
REV. 485, 612 (1993). 
26. See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text. 
27. See supra note 8. 
28. See infia notes 101-102 and accompanying text. 
29. Who is a "person" under the fourteenth amendment is not . . . the 
sort of question which can be left to individual or local decision. Too 
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other atrocities through the years.31 Similar semantics and 
justifications are present in the debate over the rights of an  
unborn life. 
Such sundry justifications are also advanced in the 
economic realm. Obviously, abortions save the government 
money when compared to government funding of social 
programs for the poor when abortion is r e ~ t r i c t e d . ~ ~  Further, 
abortions permit women and men alike freedom to pursue goals 
of self-realization without being impeded by unwanted or 
burdensome children. Nonetheless, the awful truth is that 
those who view abortion as a necessary evil balance and find 
wanting the life of the fetus against dollars saved or careers 
many basic rights hinge upon the answer. Are blacks, Jews or others, 
"persons"? The questions about foeti, blacks and others are not merely 
similar. They are the same questions-how do we define a human 
being, separately entitled to respect and value? 
Joseph W. Del lape~a,  Nor Piety nor Wit: The Supreme Court on Abortion, 6 
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 379, 399 (1974-75). 
By concluding . . . that the foetus could be no more than potential 
life, the Court [as in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)l has gained 
support by sacrificing invisible people. . . . Will future generations ponder 
these abortion decisions with the same incredulity with which many have 
come to view the segregation decisions? 
Id. at 409. 
30. Dr. Leo Alexan'der, who served as an expert at the Nuremberg trials of 
the physicians who developed the German euthanasia program and, subsequently, 
the medical experiments and genocide carried out by the Nazis, wrote: 
Whatever proportions these crimes finally assumed, it became evident 
to all who investigated them that they had started from small beginnings. 
The beginnings at first were merely a subtle shift in emphasis in the 
basic attitude of the physicians. It started with the acceptance of the 
attitude, basic in the euthanasia movement, that there is such a thing as 
life not worthy to be lived. This attitude in its early stages concerned 
itself merely with the severely and chronically sick. Gradually the sphere 
of those to be included in this category was enlarged to encompass the 
socially unproductive, the ideologically unwanted, the racially unwanted 
and finally all non-Germans. But it is important to realize that the 
infinitely small wedged-in lever from which this entire trend of mind 
received its impetus was the attitude toward the nonrehabilitable sick. 
Leo Alexander, Medical Science Under Dictatorship, 241 NEW ENG. J. MED. 39, 44 
(1949). 
31. See Nat Hentoff, The Small Beginnings' of Death, HUM. LIFE REV., Spring 
1988, a t  53, 53 (recording the trend of the courts to intervene and allow the 
killing of born individuals through euthanasia, who are deemed to have "li[ves] 
not worthy to  be lived'") (quoting Alexander, supra note 30, at 44). 
32. For every $1.00 spent by government to pay for abortions for poor 
women, about $4.00 are saved in public medical and welfare expenditures incurred 
as a result of the unintended birth. FACTS, supra note 12, at 2. 
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achieved or other self-serving endeavors. Who among us would 
like our lives reduced to such a simple equation?33 
If we are honest about the plight of women and the welfare 
of our children, then we have to realize that abortion, while a 
short-term "fix," is not the answer to the oppression and 
inequalities women face. The use of abortion for purposes of 
birth control provides a n  illusion of choicea but not true 
"freedom of choice" for women because our social culture 
devalues and oppresses women.35 Further, by strategically 
framing the issue of abortion in terms of a woman's rights, 
abortion remains specifically an individual "woman's problem." 
Such issue framing places the decision for childbearing and 
childrearing on the woman and is a sign of a society trying to 
divorce and distance itself from responsible action.36 Indeed, 
33. Abraham Lincoln understood how people could use semantics in order to 
accomplish their selfish desires when he wrote: 
Made so plain by our good Father in Heaven, that all feel and 
understand it, even down to brutes and creeping insects. The ant, who 
has toiled and dragged a crumb to his nest, will furiously defend the 
fruit of his labor, against whatever robber assails him. So plain, that the 
most dumb and stupid slave that ever toiled for a master, does constantly 
know that he is wronged. So plain that no one, high or low, ever does 
mistake it, except in a plainly selfish way; for although volume upon 
volume is written to prove slavery a very good thing, we never hear of 
the man who wishes to take the good of it, by being a slave himself. 
Abraham Lincoln, Fragment on Slavery, in 2 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM 
LINCOLN, 1848-1858, at 222, 222 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953). 
This same reasoning can be applied to the abortion debate. It has been argued 
that abortion is good for the child that may be unwanted, abused or poor if born. 
However, if this argument is valid, then why do we not hear these same people 
pushing for the deaths of those that are rejected, abused and poor? 
34. We see the woman who, without support, often feels she has "too 
much to lose" by continuing an unwanted pregnancy. She is the one 
whose college peers are most apt to say, 'You should have been 
smarter than that. This isn't supposed to happen to someone like 
you." She is the one whose boss is still apt to find a good excuse for 
terminating her employment and whose family is still apt to respond 
with shame and rejection. 
. * . .  
I have found that there are [multiple] sources of pressure directed 
toward a woman facing this most personal and vital crisis. The 
influences end up having a lot more to do with impossible trade-offs 
and Catch-22s imposed by those with vested interests than a 
liberating opportunity to express freedom of choice. To put it simply, 
the vast majority of women who submit themselves and their babies 
to abortion do so, not by "choice," but because they feel they have no 
other choice. 
Mary C. Agee, Practical Compassion, HUM. LIFE REV., Fall 1991, at 48, 50-51. 
35. See infia notes 101-102 and accompanying text. 
36. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. Other examples include our 
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unintended pregnancies and the burden of childrearing should 
be a societal ~oncern.~' Until women realize this and push for 
real change, i.e., a dismantling of society's current value 
systems which serve t o  oppress women, society, and 
particularly men, will not be held accountable and women will 
continue to  be enslaved. 
111. IS THE JUDICIAL FORUM THE PROPER BATTLEGROUND 
FOR THE ABORTION DEBATE? 
In Roe u. Wade:' the United States Supreme Court 
decided, by judicial fiat, that women have a fundamental right 
under the Constitution to  have an abortion prior to the time of 
fetal viability. It has been contended that this Supreme Court 
decision, through its failure to explore the moral underpinnings 
surrounding the abortion issue, created the current abortion 
debate.39 
[Tlhe Supreme Court in Roe . . . ruled that unless the unborn 
child is viable, the only legally significant moral factor is the 
mother's desire. All other moral considerations were declared 
to be constitutionally irrelevant. The [law struck down in Roe] 
denied the moral dilemmas involved in pregnancies resulting 
from rape or incest, in pregnancies involving severe and 
medically untreatable birth defects, with maternal health- 
impairing pregnancies, and others-moral dilemmas which, 
by the 1960s, troubled most Americans. Likewise, the Roe 
rule of abortion on demand completely disregards the moral 
dilemmas of the use of abortion for birth control, for financial 
reasons, for population control, and for other reasons of mere 
social convenience, which trouble most Americans today." 
Because of our diverse society, it is doubtful that there can 
a uniform consensus on the propriety of abortion. Whether 
society's response to the failure of affirmative action to meaningfully incorporate 
minorities into the "American Dream," by calling it a "minority," or more 
particularly, a "Black problem"; and our society's growing response to the 
difficulties facing its elderly, terminally ill, mentally ill and otherwise challenged 
individuals by allowing them to "die with dignity" before they become completely 
without value and a greater burden on the national welfare system. 
37. As is said in an African proverb of unknown authorship, "It takes a 
whole village to raise a child." 
38. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
39. LYNN D. WARDLE & MARY ANNE Q. WOOD, A LAWYER LOOKS AT 
ABORTION 205 (1982). 
40. Id. at 207. 
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to bear a child and, more importantly, whether to require a 
woman to bear a child rather than allow her to abort the fetus 
are emotionally charged questions whose answers are embraced 
in deeply held beliefs. Accordingly, the use of the judicial 
system to answer the important question on the future viability 
of abortion as an alternative to traditional methods of birth 
control will not resolve the issue. The judicial system cannot 
provide a solution that is workable because it is not a forum in 
which the moral concerns of the people can be weighed in a 
balance that is right for them." What is needed is a forum 
where the people can be involved in the decisionmaking 
process. The forum must permit people to communicate their 
concerns regarding abortion and allow them to work towards a 
solution that is amenable to all. The forum best qualifled for 
41. Michael Perry had indicated that, although the Constitution did not 
support a woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy as a right of privacy, 
[tlhe dimensions of the right of privacy invoked in Roe are determined 
not by the Constitution but by conventional morality. Consequently, to say 
that the right of privacy protects a woman's decision to have an abortion 
is necessarily to say that the objective of prohibiting such decisions lacks 
support in conventional morality. To say that is to say the objective is 
illegitimate, because conventional morality is the touchstone of the 
legitimacy of governmental objectives under substantive due process. Thus, 
in Roe the Court did not really balance two competing "goods," but 
concluded that the legislation, the objective of which was illegitimate 
according to conventional morality, was not a "good" at  all. 
Michael J. Perry, Substantive Due Process Revisited: Reflections on (and Beyond) 
Recent Cases, 71 Nw. U.  L. REV. 417, 421 (1976) (footnote omitted). 
Perry's contention that the Court was accurate in its implicit evaluation of 
conventional moral culture was later criticized: 
This argument turns on the notion that Roe rests on moral notions 
widely shared among the American people. Note however, that this 
defense is effective only if the principle of conventional morality is stated 
at  a relatively high level of generality. If we look at enacted statutes as 
evidence of what Americans conventionally believe is correct, we may 
acquire a more precise-and quite differentunderstanding of what 
conventional morality requires. 
GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., C O N ~ I O N A L  LAW 933 (2d ed. 1991) (emphasis 
added). 
Perry subsequently modified his views: 
Just as there is no singular American tradition sufficiently determinate to 
be of help to the Court in resolving particular human rights conflicts, and 
just as the concrete traditions that do exist are fragmented and point 
every which way, so too there are no consensual values sufficiently 
determinate to be of help to the Court, and the values that do enjoy 
significant support are, in our pluralist culture, fragmented and point in 
many different directions. 
MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSI'ITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 94 (1982). 
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this is the legislature. Moreover, because of the diversity of the 
populace, it is best that the individual state legislatures rather 
than the federal legislature handle this issue so that all will 
have their views heard and represented. However, within the 
current judicial framework, the Court is ill-equipped to address 
all the moral bases for and against abortion such that all 
people can believe that their views were heard and adequately 
repre~ented.'~ The Court in Roe hinged its decision on two 
points: the right of a woman to her own body and the right of 
the woman t o  be free of undue interference by the state in her 
choice to have an abortion prior to the viability of the fetus. 
Since Roe, the Court has acknowledged some of the moral 
tensions present in the abortion deci~ion*~ and has also de- 
42. For example, in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992), the 
Court considered Pennsylvania's restrictive abortion statute and struck down the 
spousal notification clause but upheld the parental consent requirement. 
[Tlhe Court failed to accord pregnant adolescent victims of family violence 
the same protection it granted similarly victimized pregnant women. . . . 
. . . Because children are physically and emotionally dependent on 
their parents, minors are more vulnerable to violence and psychological 
maltreatment and are more susceptible to developmental setbacks as a 
result of such abuse. . . . 
Surely an adolescent who fears violence and psychological abuse 
should her parents learn of her pregnancy or her intention to have an 
abortion is entitled to the same protection as an adult woman who fears 
her spouse. 
The Supreme Court, 1991 Term-Leading Cases, 106 HARV. L. REV. 163, 207 (1992) 
(footnote omitted). 
43. Liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt. Yet 19 years 
a h r  our holding that the Constitution protects a woman's right to 
terminate her pregnancy in its early stages, that definition of liberty 
is still questioned. . . . 
. . . .  
Men and women of good conscience can disagree, and we suppose 
some always shall disagree, about the profound moral and spiritual 
implications of terminating a pregnancy, even in its earliest stage. 
Some of us as individuals find abortion offensive to our most basic 
principles of morality, but that cannot control our decision. Our 
obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own 
moral code. . . . 
. . . .  
. . . As with abortion, reasonable people will have differences of 
opinion about these matters. One view is based on such reverence for 
the wonder of creation that any pregnancy ought to be welcomed and 
carried to full term no matter how difficult it will be to provide for 
the child and ensure its well-being. Another is that the inability to 
provide for the nurture and care of the infant is a cruelty to the child 
and an anguish to the parent. These are intimate views with infinite 
variations . . . . 
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moted the right to an abortion from a fundamental right t o  a 
liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth A~nendment.'~ 
Nonetheless, this acknowledgment has not served to provide 
the populace with a sense of representation such that the 
abortion issue can be put to  rest. The role of morals is even 
acknowledged by Laurence Tribe. Initially, he was of the 
opinion that the Roe Court was correct in assigning 
decisionmaking responsibility to the woman because any 
answer to the question of when a separately valued human life 
began was necessarily a religious affirmation.45 He has since 
recanted this opinion, stating: 
[My former1 view appears to give too little weight to the value 
of allowing religious groups freely to express their convictions 
in the political process, underestimates the power of moral 
convictions unattached to  religious beliefs on this issue, and 
makes the unrealistic assumption that a constitutional ruling 
could somehow disentangle religion from future public debate 
on the q~es t ion?~ 
These morals also play a role in the appropriate scope of 
judicial review. Harry Wellington expressed this view when he 
stated: 
Roe perpetuates . . . a basic terminological mistake: The 
Court insists on describing the plaintiffs interest a s  
"fundamental." This is misleading, for i t  suggests either that 
the' text of the Constitution has singled out the abortion 
decision for special attention or that the judge, as wise 
philosopher, has imposed his ethical system upon the people. 
My claim has been that the plaintiffs interest is protected 
under the Fourteenth Amendment by reference to the people: 
that the meaning of liberty in that Amendment and its 
weight in the context of the Texas abortion statute 
depends . . . upon its weight in conventional morality.47 
Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2803-08 (citation omitted). 
44. See infra notes 51-57 and accompanying text. 
45. Laurence H. Tribe, The Supreme Court, 1972 Term-Foreword: Toward a 
Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1, 18-25, 28- 
32 (1973). 
46. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1350 (2d ed. 1988) 
(emphasis added; footnote omitted). 
47. Harry H. Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Doubk 
Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221, 299 (1973) (footnote 
omitted). 
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The analysis that follows in this section continues this line 
of reasoning and attempts to demonstrate that, although the 
Court has tried to address some of the moral concerns 
underlying the abortion decision, it has not been successful in 
resolving them nor has it negated the public's need for a moral 
discourse on the circumstances, if any, in which an abortion 
should be allowed and with what restrictions. 
A. A Woman Has a Right to Control Her Own Body 
In Roe u. Wadep8 the United States Supreme ~oukfound  
that a woman had a right to  reproductive choice. Her right to  
have an abortion was fundamental and could only be impaired 
if the state could demonstrate a compelling reason." Evolving 
from the right of privacy," a woman's right to reproductive 
choice signified her right to  control her own body. However, 
subsequent cases5' have retreated from the position that re- 
productive choice is a fundamental right5' and have instead 
settled on the notion that reproductive choice is a liberty inter- 
est protected by the Fourteenth Amendment." This demotion 
from a fimdamental right to  a constitutionally protected liberty 
interest means that states need only demonstrate that their 
regulatory scheme does not unduly burden a woman's choice to 
have an abortion.54 Consequently, states have greater latitude 
in proscribing abortions in those situations which may morally 
offend its citizenry than they did immediately after Roe v. 
Wade. States can express a preference for childbirth over abor- 
tionS5 and can demonstrate that preference by allocating pub- 
48. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
49. See id. at 152-55. 
50. "This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth 
Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action . . . 
or . . . in the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to the people, is broad 
enough to  encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her 
pregnancy." Id. at 153. 
51. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992); Webster v. 
Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989). 
52. See generally Walter Dellinger & Gene B. Sperling, Abortion and the Su- 
preme Court: The Retreat from Roe v. Wade, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 83 (1989) (criticiz- 
. 
ing the plurality opinion in Webster for not explaining why the right to have an 
abortion is no longer fundamental). 
53. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2804. 
54. See id. at 2830. 
55. Webster, 492 US. at 509 (upholding a Missouri statute which prohibited 
public funding of abortion, restricted the use of public employees and facilities for 
the performance of non-therapeutic abortions and required physicians to test for 
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lic monies to assist in the raising of children rather than for 
abortion.56 States can also prohibit the use of public family 
planning funds for abortion counseling or referrals." 
The argument can be made that by procuring an abortion, 
a woman is merely exercising the right to control her own body. 
The fallacy of this argument, however, is that this right has 
never been ab~olute.~' For example, women are not free t o  
commit suicide,5s to introduce illegal substances into their sys- 
tems, or even to sell their own bodies for sex?' Further, in the 
case of the pregnant woman, arguably there are two bodies 
involved-that of the mother and that of the developing fe- 
t ~ s . ~ '  Although Roe indicated that the fetus does not have any 
rights entitled to Fourteenth Amendment protection,B2 the 
Supreme Court in Webster v. Reproductive Health Servicess3 
upheld a Missouri statute which stated in its preamble that 
"[tlhe life of each human being begins at conception" and that 
"[u]nborn children have protectable interests in life, health and 
well-being."64 By so holding, a plurality of the Court aff'irmed 
the right of the State to  determine the point at which its inter- 
fetal viability prior to performing abortions). 
56. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 324-26 (1980) (holding that a State that 
participates in the Medicaid program is not obligated under Title XIX to continue 
to h n d  those medically necessary abortions for which federal reimbursement is 
unavailable under the Hyde Amendment). 
57. Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1776-78 (1991) (upholding a Depart- 
ment of Health and Human Services regulation prohibiting federally funded family 
planning clinics from counseling or referring women for abortions). 
58. "In fact, it is not clear to us that the claim . . . that one has an unlimit- 
ed right to do with one's body as one pleases bears a close relationship to the 
right of privacy . . . . The Court has refused to recognize an unlimited right of 
this kind in the past." Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973). 
59. From a practical standpoint, a successful suicide is not a chargeable of- 
fense for lack of a perpetrator. However, in a failed suicide attempt, steps are 
taken to prevent a person from repeating the attempt. 
60. With few exceptions, prostitution is illegal in the United States. But see 
NEV. REV. STAT. $5 201.295-.440, 269.175 (1991). 
61. For example, it is not possible for one body to have two different blood 
types. However, a pregnant woman can be RH negative with a blood type of B 
and the fetus can be RH positive with a blood type of AB. This fact alone demon- 
strates that the fetus is a separate intrauterine being. See also i n f b  note 70 and 
accompanying text. 
62. Roe, 410 U.S. at  157-58. 
63. 492 U.S. 490 (1989). 
64. Id. at  504 n.4 (quoting Mo. REV. STAT. $8 1.205.1(1), (2) (1986)). The US. 
Supreme Court upheld this language, holding that the preamble of the Missouri 
statute was merely a declaration that did not regulate abortion in any way. 
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est in preserving fetal life is sufficiently compelling to justify 
regulating abortion.65 
B. A Woman Has a Right to Be Free of Undue Influence 
by the State in Her Choice to Have an  Abortion 
Prior to Viability of the Fetus 
The Court in Roe v. Wade acknowledged that the woman's 
right to her own body in her decision to have an  abortion was 
not absolute and could be infringed upon by the State a t  the 
point of viability.66 
The pregnant woman cannot be isolated in her privacy. 
She carries an embryo and, later, a fetus . . . . [Ilt is reason- 
able and appropriate for a State to decide that at some point 
in time another interest, that of health of the mother or that 
of potential human life, becomes significantly involved. The 
woman's privacy is no longer sole and any right of privacy she 
possesses must be measured accordingly.67 
The point of viability is an important moment because it sig- 
nals the time when the State's interest in  maternal health and 
the developing human life becomes suffciently compelling to 
justify abortion restrictions. As medical technology increases 
and becomes more refined, the viability of the fetus moves 
closer and closer to the point of conception. As Justice 
O'Connor egued  in City of Akron v. Akron Center for Repro- 
ductive 
The Roe framework, then, is clearly on a collision course 
with itself. As the medical risks of various abortion proce- 
dures decrease, the point a t  which the State may regulate for 
reasons of maternal health is moved W h e r  forward to actual 
65. In urging the abandonment of the Roe trimester framework, three Jus- 
tices stated, "we do not see why the State's interest in protecting potential human 
life should come into existence only at  the point of viability, and that there should 
therefore be a rigid line allowing state regulation after viability but prohibiting it 
before viability." Id. at  519 (plurality opinion of Rehnquist, C.J., joined by White 
and K e ~ e d y ,  JJ.). 
66. Specifically, viability is defined as the point at which the fetus "has the 
capability of meaningful life outside the mother's womb." Roe, 410 U.S. at 163. 
Therefore, viability also presumably includes survival outside the mother's womb 
with the assistance of medical technology. See, e-g., infra text accompanying note 
69. 
67. Roe, 410 U.S. at  159. 
68. 462 US. 416 (1983); cf. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 
(1992) (plurality opinion of O'Connor, K e ~ e d y ,  and Souter, JJ.). 
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childbirth. As medical science becomes better able to provide 
for the separate existence of the fetus, the point of viability is 
moved further back toward conception. . . . The Roe frame- 
work is inherently tied t o  the state of medical technology that 
exists whenever particular litigation ensues." 
Theoretically, it is possible for the point of viability t o  converge 
with the point of conception since the zygote, or fertilized egg, 
at the instance of conception, has all the genetic and other 
information needed to develop into a healthy human being? 
the only thing needed is a proper environment. 
The absurdity of looking at viability as the point where the 
fetus can survive independently outside its environment is 
illustrated by the following question: Who among us can sur- 
vive independently outside our proper environment? If a person 
is forcefully removed from the Earth and blasted off to Mars 
without the proper gear to sustain life, he or she will surely 
die. Does such a person lose his or her humanity or personhood 
because he or she is not in the proper environment to sustain 
Such inconsistencies of the viability test have been recog- 
nized. In Webster, the plurality stated that the Roe framework 
of trimesters and viability was not found in the text of the 
Con~titution.'~ Further, they saw no reason "why the State's 
interest in protecting potential human life should come into 
existence only at the point of viability . . . . '[Tlhe State's inter- 
est, if compelling after viability, is equally compelling before 
viability.' "73 
69. City of A m n ,  462 U.S. at 458 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
70. "The fertilized egg or zygote ultimately develops into the adult organism. 
The physical characteristics of the adult organism are determined by the informa- 
tion coded in the DNA molecules within the zygote. No information can be added 
later. All that is required is present in that single, original cell." T.H. Milby, The 
New Biology and the Question of Personhood: Implications for Abortion, 9 AM. J.L. 
& MED. 31, 35 (1983). 
71. For example, the people of Somalia were dying from starvation. Arguably, 
their drought-ridden and war-ravaged environment was not capable of sustaining 
their lives. Without external assistance, many were doomed to die. Should we have 
written them off as non-persons as well? 
72. Webster v. Reproductive Health Sews., 492 U.S. 490, 518 (1989) (plurality 
opinion of Rehnquist, C.J., joined by White and K e ~ e d y ,  JJ.). 
73. Id. at 519 (plurality opinion of Rehnquist, C.J., joined by White and Ken- 
nedy, JJ.) (quoting Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecolo- 
gists, 476 U.S. 747, 795 (1986) (White, J., dissenting)). 
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To distinguish our lives from that of the embryo as actual- 
ized life versus potential life misses the point as well.74 At the 
point of conception, the fertilized ovum is a living cell and is 
distinctly humanT5 The mere fact that medical science is not 
presently advanced enough to nurture the extrauterine fertil- 
ized ovum to full development does not mean that the fertilized 
ovum is not alive. It only indicates that medical science has not 
been able to successfully duplicate the proper environment for 
fetal development. Since the fertilized ovum at  the point of 
conception has all the information it needs to develop into a 
complete and healthy human being,76 it  is impossible for the 
fertilized ovum to develop into any other type of animal or 
plant life. Dr. Bernard Nathanson, M.D., the co-founder of the 
National Abortion Rights Action League (NARLXL)~~ and for- 
mer director of the Center for Reproductive and Sexual Health, 
the largest abortion clinic in the nation,78 stated that 
[als early as six weeks we can detect heart function in embry- 
os, with an electrocardiograph. We can record brain activity 
74. As Justice O'Connor aptly stated: 
The diffmlty with [the analysis that the State does not have an impor- 
tant and legitimate interest in protecting human life until the point of 
fetal viability] is clear: potential life is no less potential in the first weeks 
of pregnancy than it is a t  viability or afterward. At any stage in pregnan- 
cy, there is the potential for human life. . . . The choice of viability as 
the point at which the state interest in potential life becomes compelling 
is no less arbitrary than choosing any point before viability or any point 
afterward. 
City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 US. 416, 461 (1982) 
(O'Co~or, J., dissenting). 
75. Stedman's Medical Dictionary defines fertilization as "[tlhe process that 
begins with the penetration of the secondary oocyte by the spermatozoon and is 
completed with the fusion of the male and female pronuclei." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL 
DICTIONARY 516 (23d ed. 1976). In its definition of pronucleus, it states that 
"[wlhen the pronuclei merge in fertilization, the diploid number of chromosomes 
characteristic of the species is reestablished." Id. at 1148 (emphasis added). Lastly, 
Stedman's Medical Dictionay defines a zygote as "[tlhe diploid cell resulting from 
union of a sperm and an ovum. . . . The ind i v idd  that develops from a fertilized 
ovum." Id. at 1588 (emphasis added). 
76. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
77. Bernard Nathanson, A Righteous Censorship, NEWSDAY, June 4, 1991, at 
56, 56. 
78. Id. "As former head of the world's largest abortion clinic . . . 1 bear ulti- 
mate responsibility for over 75,000 abortions.' His dramatic move to the pro-life 
pulpit evolved, he says, with advances in obstetrics and fetology, which have 'al- 
lowed us to perceive without question the unmistakable humanity of the unborn 
child.'" Kristin McMurran, Picks & Pans-Video: Eclipse of Reuson, PEOPLE, July 
17, 1989, at 17, 17. 
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at  eight weeks. Our capacity to measure signs of life is becom- 
ing more sophisticated every day, and as time goes by we will 
undoubtedly be able to isolate these signs a t  earlier and ear- 
lier stages in fetal development. To vehemently deny that life 
begins when conception begins is absurd!" 
Perhaps our existence can be distinguished and justified by 
the fact that the fetus's proper environment happens to  be in 
the body of another human being. But should such dependence 
make the fetus less alive and less human so that it should have 
no rights at all in the decision of whether it should be allowed - 
to  live or die? "The fact that a fetus depends on the placenta for 
life and can't survive independently doesn't nullify its existence 
as a human being. A diabetic is wholly dependent on insulin, 
but that doesn't make him less humadso 
The argument is also raised that even though a woman 
should or ought to  permit the birth of her unborn child, it does 
not follow that the unborn child has a right to be born.'' Ju- 
dith Thomson, a proponent of this view, advanced a hypotheti- 
cal situation wherein she compared the right to  life of an un- 
born child with her right to have Henry Fonda save her life.82 
She concluded that, although she may be "sick unto death, and 
the only thing that will save [her] life is the touch of Henry 
Garn, supra note 24, at 46 (quoting Dr. Bernard Nathanson). 
Id. (quoting Dr. Nathanson). 
Judith J. Thomson, A Defense of Abortion, 1 PHIL. & PUB. Am. 47, 60 
In some views having a right to life includes having a right to be 
given at least the bare minimum one needs for continued life. But 
suppose that what in fact is the bare minimum a man needs for 
continued life is something he has no right at  all to be given? If I am 
sick unto death, and the only thing that will save my life is the 
touch of Henry Fonda's cool hand on my fevered brow, then all the 
same, I have no right to be given the touch of Henry Fonda's cool 
hand on my fevered brow. It would be frightfully nice of him to fly in 
from the West Coast to provide it. . . . But I have no right at all 
against anybody that he should do this for me. . . . 
. . . .  
. . . But suppose he isn't on the West Coast. Suppose he has only 
to walk across the room, place a hand briefly on my brow-and lo, 
my life is saved. Then surely he ought to do it, it would be indecent 
to refuse. Is it to be said "Ah, well, it follows that in this case she 
has a right to the touch of his hand on her brow, and so i t  would be 
an injustice in him to rehse"? So that I have a right to it when it is 
easy for him to provide it, though no right when it's hard? 
Id. at 55, 61. 
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Fonda's cool hand on [her] fevered brow," she had "no right at 
all against anybody that he should do this for [her]."83 
The fallacy with this reasoning is that in Thomson's exam- 
ple, Henry Fonda did nothing to cause her impending and 
seemingly certain demise. If he had, his subsequent failure to 
cross the room or fly from the West Coast to touch his hand on 
her brow would be morally reprehensible. He was the one who 
initiated the process leading up to her certain death. Therefore, 
from a moral standpoint, he should be required to take steps to 
prevent her death. 
Thomson's fallacious reasoning continues when she con- 
tends that, although the woman who aborts may be deemed a 
"bad samaritan" for refusing to  assist the child in its quest to 
be born, there is no law requiring her, or anyone else for that 
matter, to  be a "good samaritan."84 Accordingly, the argument 
continues, a woman should not be required by law to  be a "good 
samaritan" and allow her unborn child to use her body for the 
complete term of pregnancy.85 Implicit in this argument is 
83. Id. at 55. 
84. [Ilt is worth drawing attention to the fact that in no state in this 
country is any man compelled by law to be even a Minimally Decent 
Samaritan to any person . . . . By contrast, in most states in this 
country women are compelled by law to be not merely Minimally 
Decent Samaritans, but Good Samaritans to unborn persons inside 
them. 
Id. at 63. This argument is refuted by the fact that a legal duty of affirmative 
action arises if a tortfeasor caused the injury. 
Justifications for the traditional reluctance of courts to impose affirmative 
duties to warn or otherwise act to prevent injury to another include the 
impracticability of imposing such duties and a recognition of a defendant's 
interest in "keeping to himself' and in not being inconvenienced by a 
requirement to a d  for the prevention of harm to others. Neither of these 
policy justifications outweigh society's interest in preventing avoidable 
injuries and providing a remedy to those injured when otherwise innocent 
affirmative conduct by a defendant has contributed to the creation of a 
danger. In such cases, by limiting liability to those whose actions have 
created a hazard, an unmanageable extension of tort liability is avoided. 
Further, to  the extent that the defendant had already decided to act in 
the manner he did in creating the danger, his interest in self-autonomy is 
diminished in importance since he has "already injected himself into the 
plaintiff's realm." 
Andrulonis v. United States, 724 F. Supp. 1421, 1494 (N.D.N.Y. 1989) (citation 
omitted) (quoting Shlomo Twerski, wzrmative Duty After Tarasoff, 11 Ho- L. 
REV. 1013, 1025 (1983)), affd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 924 F.2d 
1210 (2d Cir.), vacated sub mm. New York State Dep't of Health v. Andrulonis, 
112 S. Ct. 39 (1991); cf H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 159 N.E. 896, 898 
(N.Y. 1928). 
85. Thornson, supm note 81, at 63. 
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that the woman has not contributed to  the condition now re- 
quiring her t o  be a "good samaritan." However, statistics indi- 
cate that only approximately 1% of all abortions are the result 
of rape or incest? This means almost all women who receive 
abortions do so despite the fact that they and their partner 
have deliberately engaged in activity which causes the inci- 
dence of pregnancy.87 The good samaritanhad samaritan 
analogy does not and should not apply t o  situations in which 
the person who "ought" to help is the one who caused the plight 
of the helpless victim. Therefore, if the purpose of the law is to  
make persons accountable for their injurious actions, then 
preventing women from having abortions would not, in the 
overwhelming majority of cases, work an injustice by forcing 
them to  become "good samaritans." Indeed, it would be forcing 
them t o  become ac~ountable.~~ 
There is a tension, however, that arises when a person is 
forced to  become accountable-a tension between the right to 
self-autonomy and societal concerns. John Stuart Mill suggests 
a resolution to  this tension: 
What, then, is the rightbl limit to the sovereignty of the 
individual over [herlself? Where does the authority of society 
begin? How much of human life should be assigned to individ- 
uality, and how much to society? 
. . . To individuality should belong the part of life in 
which it is chiefly the individual that is interested; to society, 
the part which chiefly interests society. 
. . . [Elveryone who receives the protection of society 
owes a return for the benefit, and the fact of living in society 
renders it indispensable that each should be bound to  observe 
a certain line of conduct toward the rest. This conduct con- 
sists, first, in not injuring the interests of one another, or 
rather certain interests, which, either by express legal provi- 
sion or by tacit understanding, ought to be considered as 
rights; and secondly, in each person's bearing Ifierl share . . . 
of the labors and sacrifices incurred for defending the society 
or its members from injury and molestation. These conditions 
society is justified in enforcing a t  all costs to those who en- 
86. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
87. The author recognizes that nearly 2Wo of women have abortions because 
of circumstances beyond their control, such as fetal deformity and maternal health 
problems. Torres & Forrest, supra note 13, at 170. 
88. Accountability in this context means to accept consequences, i.e., the bene- 
fits and risks flowing from one's deliberate actions or omissions. 
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deavor to withhold fulfillment. . . . As soon as any part of a 
person's conduct affects prejudicially the interests of others, 
society has jurisdiction over i t  . . . .89 
In short, when others can be injured by our choices that are 
motivated, not by necessity, but by our desire for self-realiza- 
tion and well-being enhancement, we should be required to 
refrain from Mfilling our individual desires.g0 Such a commit- 
ment to the common good is necessary for justice and fairness 
to be accorded to all members of society. 
In order for members of society to be willing to sacrifice for 
the common good, they must first engage in a moral discourse 
to determine the level and extent of the sacrifices needed in 
order to accomplish an objective benefitting society as a whole. 
To require sacrifice without this discourse can cause a sense of 
estrangement among individuals and groups who believe that 
their concerns were not considered. Because of this estrange- 
ment, individuals and other underrepresented groups often 
resort to legal recourse using rights-based arguments. The use 
of legal recourse a t  this stage can be detrimental to the com- 
mon good when the issues sought to be resolved have moral 
underpinnings. When the judicial system addresses the rights- 
based arguments without considering all of the moral dilemmas 
surrounding the issue, a controversy is sparked. 
Such was the case in Roe u. Wade because it prohibited 
states from taking any action premised on their citizens' moral 
objections to ab~rtion.~' Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg echoed 
89. JOHN S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 73 (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., 1978). 
90. Since only women will be required to refrain from abortions, men should 
be required to sacrifice financially and the community at large should be required 
to restructure in such a way as to provide meaningfbl accommodations for people 
with families. 
91. I t  is popularly believed that Roe legalized abortion on demand 
only during the first trimester. This is not true, for the Court held in 
Roe that a woman's decision whether or not to have an abortion could 
not be regulated at all before viability . . . . The end of the first 
trimester is only significant in that it marks the point at which the 
state may presumably regulate the medical aspects of abortion . . . . 
But during the second trimester, until viability, the state may not 
restrict or interfere with the right of the woman to choose to have an 
abortion for any reason, or for no reason whatever. And even after 
viability, the Supreme Court said, the state cannot prohibit abortions 
necessary to save the life or health of the mother . . . . Thus, the 
Court effectively mandated legalized abortion on demand until viabili- 
ty, and, depending on the interpretation of "health," possibly afterward 
as well. 
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this sentiment when she concluded that the Court in Roe 
should have merely declared the Texas criminal abortion stat- 
ute unconstitutional, rather than proceeding on and supplant- 
ing every state abortion law then in force.g2 Roe then, repre- 
sents a failure of the judicial system to serve as the "weather 
vane" of opinion when the issues that need t o  be resolved have 
divergent moral bases. 
IV. EFFECTING TRUE SOCIAL CHANGE 
In my experience, I have found that both sides of the abor- 
tion controversy can agree that abortion represents a trage- 
dy." For abortion proponents, it is seen as an all-too-neces- 
sary evil. For abortion opponents, the obvious tragedy is the 
termination of the unborn life. It is doubtful whether the pro- 
life and pro-choice forces will agree on the propriety and moral- 
ity of abortion.g4 However, these two forces should be able to 
agree that abortion is not a procedure that one should strive to  
obtain because it is good in and of itself. Therefore, the focus of 
any fruitful meeting between pro-life and pro-choice forces 
should be on developing strategies to eliminate the necessity 
WARDLE & WOOD, supra note 39, at 53. 
92. As Ruth Bader Ginsburg stated: 
The 7-2 judgment in Roe v. Wade declared "violative of the Due Pro- 
cess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment" a Texas criminal abortion 
statute that "[excepted] from criminality only a life saving procedure on 
behalf of the [pregnant woman]." Suppose the Court had stopped there, 
thus declaring unconstitutional the most extreme brand of law in the 
nation, and had not gone on, as the Court did in Roe, to fashion a re- 
gime blanketing the subject, a set of rules that displaced virtually every 
state law then in force? Would there have been the 20-year controversy 
we have witnessed, reflected most recently in the Supreme Court's splint- 
ered decision in Planned Parenthood v. Casey? A less encompassing Roe, I 
believe . . . might have served to reduce rather than to he1 controversy. 
Excerpts from Ginsburg Speeches, Decisions, N.Y. LJ., June 15, 1993, at  2. 
93. In my own discussions with those who are proponents of abortion rights, 
I have yet to find anyone who would say that abortion is something that is good 
for the woman or something that every woman should experience. They agree that 
abortion represents a failure: a failure in planning, a failure in the birth control 
method used, a failure in conceiving a child free of birth defeds, a failure of the 
mother's body to safely withstand childbearing, a failure of the relationship be- 
tween the man and woman, et.. However, what we disagree on is whether the 
availability of abortion as an alternative for traditional methods of b i i h  control for 
women is good. 
94. It is not realistic that our pluralistic society could achieve true communal 
solidarity and unity of social purpose for such an issue. See Lawrence B. Solum, 
Pluralism and Modernity, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 93, 95 (1990). 
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for abortion as an alternative to traditional methods of birth 
control. 
To see the issue of abortion only in terms of the rights of 
the fetus or of the rights of the woman skirts around the con- 
cerns central to a woman's decision whether to have an abor- 
tion. The only way to  persuade women to  not have abortions is 
to first attempt to  see life through their eyes and then work 
towards solutions for their particular  problem^.'^ For the indi- 
vidual woman, the focus is on her alternatives and the conse- 
quences of those alternatives, not on her or her child's rights. 
Thus, progress in the abortion context can only occur when 
both sides of the abortion debate agree to  look beyond their 
own rhetoric and generalities and look to specific situations for 
ways to address the abortion problem, both short- and long- 
term. 
A first step in effectuating true social change is persuading 
women that they can have meaningful opportunities to  pursue 
their goals of self-realization without using abortion as an 
optional method of birth control. For them to  be persuaded, 
women need to feel confident that having and raising children 
will not be a burden that they alone must bear. Therefore, the 
first strategy should encompass ways to restructure society so 
that women will have meaningful support-psychologically, 
economically and morally-in the bearing and rearing of their 
children. It is inappropriate and indeed callous for society to 
force women to bear children by prohibiting abortions without 
providing concomitant relief for the certain burdens that go 
along with childbirth and ~hildrearing.'~ 
I view the following legislative and societal changes as 
providing the support women need and should receive: (1) busi- 
nesses should be required to accommodate mothers and fa- 
thers'' who need to  spend time with their families by provid- 
95. The multiplicity of reasons for choosing to have an abortion suggests 
that even if one specific problem is solved, it will not be enough to 
change most women's decision. . . . This suggests that actions directed 
toward helping women who are unintentionally pregnant avoid abor- 
tion would be most effective if tailored to the individual. 
Torres & Forrest, supm note 13, at 175. 
96. "Findings from [the survey on why women have abortions] indicate that 
eliminating (or even substantially reducing the number of) abortions once women 
have become unintentionally pregnant will be very dimcult, if not impossible, be- 
cause the reasons women turn to abortion are so numerous and varied." Id. at 
176. 
97. It is important for businesses to recognize that men share responsibility 
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ing flexible schedules and leave time for new parents; (2) par- 
ents who choose to  continue working while raising their chil- 
dren should not be penalized by being taken off the promotion 
track; and (3) government needs to assist in establishing safe, 
high-quality, low-cost child care centers. These changes will 
provide women with some flexibility, enabling them to achieve 
their career goals and aspirations without sacrificing their own 
or their children's well-being. As for women who abort because 
of rejection by family members, economic difficulties or unsta- 
ble relationships, centers should be established to provide shel- 
ter and medical treatment during their pregnancy. Opportuni- 
ties for education and job training should be made available to 
them to assist them in becoming financially independent. The 
money spent by businesses and society a t  large would be well 
spent because i t  would assist women in their self-realization 
efforts, increase their contributions to society, and provide the 
children with an environment which prepares them to become 
productive members of society. 
In addition to legislative efforts to provide women support, 
the legal system must better enforce existing laws that con- 
demn men's oppression of women. Our legal system needs to be 
more sensitive to  victims of rape and other forms of sexual 
abuse and enforce the laws more stringently against the perpe- 
trators. Individuals who rape and/or commit incest should re- 
ceive punishment commensurate with their crime. The perpe- 
trators, rather than the victims, should suffer the shame, hu- 
miliation and rejection resulting from their crime. Additionally, 
a better system needs to be put in place to make non-custodial 
fathers financially accountable.'8 
However, accountability should not stop there; a fair sys- 
tem would also require the men to become more accountable by 
requiring them t o  become "good samaritans" in the raising of 
their children?' Arguably, a law prohibiting men and women 
from using abortion as an alternative to traditional methods of 
birth control does not overstep the boundary between the rights 
of the individual and the rights of society at  large. Without its 
children, in quality and in quantity, society is doomed to ex- 
tinction. As future wage earners and taxpayers, children play a 
vital role in preserving the societal infrastructure. Consequent- 
for childrearing that goes beyond providing financial support. 
98. See supra note 5 .  
99. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
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ly, it is only reasonable that society seek ways to protect its 
children, both born and unborn. 
Although such legislation is an  important first step in 
acknowledging the fact that women suffer inequalities, it is not 
altogether effective in changing the societal value systems from 
which the inequalities stem. Generally, the law only reflects a 
society's prevailing values, beliefs and mores; it cannot create 
them. If there is a societal belief that devalues women and 
their contributions, legislation may initially provide some relief 
for women,lM but ultimately, there must be a conscious dis- 
mantling of the value systems in place which operate to sub- 
ordinate women to men. It is not enough for society to say that 
women should not allow themselves to get pregnant without 
first changing the social culture that subordinates women and 
makes them vulnerable sexually to men.l0' 'Women are so- 
cialized to be compliant and accommodating, sensitive to the 
feelings of others, and frightened of physical power; men are 
socialized to take advantage of every opportunity to engage in 
sexual intercourse and to use sex to express dominance and 
power."102 Since legislation alone is insufficient, society must 
use the power of socialization positively to abolish the subordi- 
nation of women. 
Abortion, like the sexual revolution, will not free women 
from their subordination and enslavement.lo3 Instead, it can 
only serve to exchange one type of bondage for another.lo4 
Aborting the unborn may give women more flexibility in  their 
100. Catharine MacKi~on  defined women's rights "in the negative as a bound- 
ary protection to freedom of individual action and says 'no amount of negative 
freedom legally guaranteed to the [oppressed] group will make it the equal of the 
first [group].'" Susan G. Kupfer, Autonomy and Community in Feminist Legal 
Thought, 22 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 583, 594 (1992) (quoting CATHARINE A. 
MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST W R Y  OF THE STATE 164 (1989)). 
Women's subordinate status often prevents them from refusing men 
sexual access to  their bodies. . . . [Plregnancy often forces women to 
become dependent on particular men. Because a woman's dependence 
on a man is assumed to entail her continued sexual loyalty to him, 
restriction of abortion serves to commit women to remaining sexually 
accessible to particular men and thus helps to perpetuate the cycle of 
oppression. 
SHERWIN, supra note 8, at 103. 
102. Id. at 103-04. 
103. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
104. See generally George Weigel, Women Reap the Rewards of Xoe' in Abuse, 
L.A. TIMES, Nov. 29, 1992, at M5, reprinted in HUM. LIFE REV., Winter 1993, at 
97 (suggesting that "spousal abuse, rape, 'trading in' older wives for younger mod- 
els, [and] the feminization of poverty" are linked with the Roe decision). 
631 ABORTION RIGHTS IN AMERICA 89 
personal life choices, but when women make these types of 
personal life decisions, the overwhelming majority of them are 
afErming the same self-centered, atomistic attitude that many 
feminists find objectionable in men.lo5 Further, abortion as a 
birth control option does not eliminate the domination and 
oppression many women facelo6 and consequently does not 
necessarily represent a meaningful choice107 to the next wom- 
an who is at that same crossroad of decision.lo8 
We need to  make an effort to effect true social change to 
solve the problems that cause the demand for abortion. A sub- 
tle tragedy of abortion is the failure of a society to take care of 
its own to the point that both men and women alike honestly 
believe that abortion is the only answer. I believe efforts should 
be made at the grass roots level to change the heart and mind 
of society so that it can better appreciate the intrinsic value of 
its female members. In the final analysis, the lives of unborn 
children should not hinge on the ability of women to  have re- 
105. Critical legal studies theorists join with radical feminists to construct 
the following syllogism: individualism maximizes the selfkh, atomistic 
goals of (male normed) beings, leads to a concern for rights which 
protect the privileges gained against the state or the claims of others 
within the community and defeats collective movement for social 
change. Some see rights as alienating in themselves, creating a situa- 
tion where there is no possibility of true community. 
Kupfer, supra note 100, at 595 (footnote omitted). 
106. In feminist terms, [Roe] translates the ideology of the private sphere 
into the individual woman's legal right to privacy as a means of sub- 
ordinating women's collective needs to the imperatives of male su- 
premacy. 
. . . .  
. . . [Ulnder conditions of gender inequality, [Roe] does not free 
women, it frees male sexual aggression. The availability of abortion 
. . . removes the one remaining legitimized reason that women have 
had for refbsing sex besides the headache. 
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Roe v. Wade: A Study in Male Ideology, in ABORTION: 
MORAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 45, 49-51 (Jay L. Garfield & Patricia Hennessey 
eds. 1984). 
107. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
108. In fad, because of the ease of procurement and the relative low cost of 
abortion, many women will succumb to an abortion, not because it is their person- 
al decision but because of pressure from others. See supra note 34. It  is my con- 
tention that many women abort their unborn because they believe that it is expect- 
ed of them; to do otherwise would be selfish and not provide the best environment 
for the child. Although women have other alternatives besides abortion, they are 
not viable because of these external pressures. As long as women continue to suc- 
cumb to such pressures rather than demand respect for their decision to carry 
their fetus to term and demand support during their pregnancy, women will not 
have meaningful choice. 
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productive freedom, but rather on the ability of women to expe- 
rience freedom in the purest sense of the word. 
In order to experience this type of freedom, first, women 
must awaken to the fact that their ability to bear children is ' 
not a curse hindering them from achieving self-realization. Nor 
is this ability something to  be taken lightly, with no deliberate 
effort given t o  responsible action and foreplanning. The ability 
to physically bear children is a unique and special gift that 
only women have and childbearing and childrearing are two of 
life's greatest experiences. 
Second, women should push for a shift in societal values, 
urging society to give the proper deference to  motherhood and 
women's equality in general. Sexual promiscuity of both men 
and women, done under the guise of sexual freedom, reinforces 
the notion that women, and more particularly, their bodies, are 
provided for the pleasure of men. Currently, contributions by 
women, whether maternal, intellectual or otherwise, are dis- 
counted and de~alued.''~ When women begin to value them- 
selves, not in reference to  men,"' but for what they are in- 
trinsically and for all their unique qualities and abilities, then 
they can be a force in urging men and society in general to give 
equal credence to them-not because they have become like 
men-but because as women they have, in and of themselves, 
inherent value."' The reinstilling of moral values and virtues 
109. See i e a  note 111 and accompanying text. 
110. A person's social worth should not be determined by someone else. In- 
stead, a person's quality of life should be defined by their individual moral ex- 
pression that gives their life meaning. In defining the appropriate region of human 
liberty, John Stuart Mill stated that 
[ilt comprises, f ist ,  the inward domain of consciousness, demanding liber- 
ty of conscience in the most comprehensive sense, liberty of thought and 
feeling, absolute freedom of opinion and sentiment on all subjects, practi- 
cal or speculative, scientific, moral, or theological. . . . Secondly, the prin- 
ciple requires liberty of tastes and pursuits, of framing the plan of our 
life to suit our own character, of doing as we like, subject to such conse- 
quences as may follow, without impediment from our fellow creatures, so 
long as what we do does not harm them, even though they should think 
our conduct foolish, perverse, or wrong. 
MILL, supra note 89, at 11-12 (emphasis added). 
111. 
Kupfer, 
Since the effect of sexist or patriarchical experience in our culture is 
to demean, marginalize and subordinate women, it seems necessary to 
undo that damage, to rekindle the individual sense of self-worth be- 
fore undertaking the dismantling of the cultural constructs. I t  is m- 
cult to see how the collective experience can fuel movement toward 
change without attainment of autonomy for individual women. 
supra note 100, at 598. 
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that promote self-esteem and care for others should be promot- 
ed through education, through laws that encourage and compel 
non-custodial parents t o  financially provide for their children, 
and most importantly, through laws that promote and encour- 
age equal employment opportunities among the populace. 
Third, along with true equality for women, efforts should 
be made to reverse the trend in which people determine what 
quality of life is sufficient in order to have a human being's life 
considered worth living. It is indeed a sad commentary that a 
society, supposedly compassionate and enlightened, would per- 
mit any group of individuals to decide whether another human 
being should live or be born. Who among us living today under- 
stands the meaning and purpose-of life such that we feel quali- 
fied to find that someone cannot live up to that standard? How 
can we determine with any degree of certainty whether their 
contribution (or potential contribution if unborn) is so insignifi- 
cant and devoid of value that it would be better for everyone 
that they die or never be born? Further, once we commit to this 
line of reasoning, how can we rebut another's contention that 
we do not measure up t o  his or her understanding of what life 
is and should be?'12 It is true that to allow those who are not 
fully functional or independent to live or be born will create a 
burden113 on those around them, but then again, we have all 
been burdens at some point in time and, if we live long enough, 
we will be burdens again.ll4 
112. President Lincoln saw the danger in allowing one group of individuals to 
determine the rights of others when he asked: 
If A. can prove, however conclusively, that he may, of right, enslave 
B.-why may not B. snatch the same argument, and prove equally, that 
he may enslave A?- 
You say A. is white, and B. is black. It is color, then; the lighter, 
having the right to enslave the darker? Take care. By this rule, you are 
to be slave to the first man you meet, with a fairer skin than your own. 
You do not mean color exactly?-You mean the whites are intellectual- 
ly the superiors of the blacks, and, therefore have the right to enslave 
them? Take care again. By this rule, you are to be slave to the first man 
you meet, with an intellect superior to your own. 
But, say you, it is a question of interest; and, if you can make it your 
interest, you have the right to enslave another. Very well. And if he can 
make it his interest, he has the right to enslave you. 
Abraham Lincoln, Fragment on Slavery, in 2 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM 
LINCOLN, 1848-1858, supra note 33, at  222, 222-23. 
113. It is my belief that not all burdens are negative in their impact on the 
provider. For example, there may be spiritual or emotional benefits to people car- 
ing for those often considered burdensome. 
114. Indeed, each one of us, through our decisions and our very being, impact 
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It has been said that those who argue for the rights of the 
fetus to be carried to term have a 'love affair with the fe- 
t ~ s " " ~  but no concern for the rights or well-being of children 
once they are born.ll6 While it is true that society has not 
done a good job in protecting its children fkom abuse, it must 
be conceded that society is not comprised solely of pro-life indi- 
viduals; the pro-choice contingent needs to accept some of the 
blame itself. A lot of money has been raised through private 
efforts to protect the rights of women to have abortions; media 
coverage abounds on the pro-choice and "safe sex" messages. 
Why do we not see this same demonstration of commitment 
and support, financially and otherwise, to stopping rape, child 
abuse and promiscuous sex? Are we not at  all concerned about 
eradicating the problem that gives rise to the symptoms? Al- 
though problem eradication takes a long-term focus and women 
considering abortion will not receive as much, or any, benefit as 
the "short-term fix" that abortion would allow, women as a 
group will benefit in the long run as beneficiaries of a more en- 
lightened, compassioned society which protects and values each 
of its members. 
In such a society, the role of the legal system should be t o  
ensure that everyone's rights, as evidenced by the societal val- 
ue structures, are protected. Consequently, it is of utmost im- 
portance that the societal value structures stress the sanctity of 
life and the intrinsic value of all its members. In addition, the 
value structure should not permit the making of laws that 
enable people to escape responsibility for their actions."' 
those around us, both positively and negatively. This impact can be viewed by 
others as a burden upon them because it forces them to make changes and adjust- 
ments in their lives. Notwithstanding this view, we still assert our right-not only 
to live, but to live our way despite the effects on others. 
115. "On Jaduary] 18, 1992, [Dr. Joycelyn] Elders told the Arkansas Coalition 
for Choice, We would like for the right-to-life and anti-choice groups to really get 
over their love affair with the fetus.'" Sherry Tyree, Is Anti-Catholicism 'Acceptable' 
Bigotry?, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Sept. 22, 1993, at 7B. 
116. If this is true, then it must also be true that those who see the issue of 
abortion as embracing only the woman's rights have a "hate affair with the fetus" 
because of their absolute resolve to place the desires of the woman paramount la 
the life of her unborn child. 
117. As Douglas Wilder, then-Governor of Virginia, noted: 
More than ever, our young people must come to understand that 
making mature decisions; making life-long commitments; making struc- 
tured and loving families-rather than merely making babies; and making 
the most of the opportunities that do exist in every aspect of life; these 
are the actions that constitute the beginning of a passage into manhood. 
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If we lived in an ideal world, there would be no abortions; 
every child would indeed be a wanted child. However, the 
world we live in is an imperfect one, where, if I must concede 
anything to the pro-choice movement, the realities of today's 
life offer little support to women in trouble.lls Consequently, 
abortion is considered to be the most logical and viable option 
for many of them. Nevertheless, living in an imperfect world 
does not mandate the use of imperfect solutions.11g Abortion 
is an imperfect solution because it does not correct or eradicate 
the oppression and domination to which many women are sub- 
jected. Abortion can only eliminate one of many symptoms of 
the oppression. If meaningful change is desired, then strategies 
for change and equality for women must emphasize problem 
eradication strategies rather than symptom elimination strate- 
gies alone. With symptom elimination strategies, the problem 
remains yet becomes less obtrusive to people because they are 
not confronted with the symptoms they find most offensive, 
such as child abuse, unwanted children and poverty. However, 
symptom elimination does not eliminate the child abuser, the 
selfish reasons why children become unwanted or the poverty 
mentality of materialistic people who seek more no matter how 
. . . .  
But-as common sense tells us-there are precautions to be taken by 
the young and by the unmarried, especially for those who know that they 
are not remotely close to being ready for the unending responsibilities of 
parenthood. If they want to have a future, it is imperative that our 
young-male and female alike-embrace the ultimate precau- 
tion-abstinence. For as others have noted, "The essence of chastity is the 
total orientation of one's life toward a goal," and-in this instance-that 
goal must be a life of self-discipline, self-improvement and an abiding 
spirit of selflessness-a willingness to work for the common good of fami- 
ly and community alike; to take full advantage of all opportunities which 
do exist, and to make full use of the freedoms that are rightfully theirs. 
L. Douglas Wilder, To Save the Black Family, the Young Must Abstain, WALL ST. 
J., Mar. 28, 1991, at A14, reprinted in HUM. LIFE REV., Spring 1991, at 108, 108- 
09. 
118. See supra note 34. 
119. John Stuart Mill stated that 
[hluman beings owe to each other help to distinguish the better from the 
worse, and encouragement to choose the former and avoid the latter. 
They should be for ever stimulating each other to increased exercise of 
their higher faculties, and increased direction of their feelings and aims 
towards wise instead of foolish, elevating instead of degrading, objects and 
contemplations. 
MILL, supra note 89, at 74. 
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much they already have. In fact, by not eliminating the prob- 
lem, new symptoms become manifest to  take the place of those 
previously eliminated. 
It can be argued that problem eradication is unrealistic 
and can never be achieved. However, along with seeking to  
eliminate the problem, problem eradication strategies operate 
under the assumption that humanity's position is not hopeless, 
therefore serving to  inspire the populace to adopt a less reac- 
tionary stance when confronted by life circumstances. It is at 
this point where the individual, whether male or female, is 
truly free in making a choice. The circumstances do not dictate 
the course of action; the individual does. 
That is why it is necessary that with legislative rather 
than judicial action, emphasis should be placed on changing the 
heart and mind of society to care for those in need (problem 
eradication) rather than upon abortion rights (symptom elimi- 
nation). Although this approach has a long-term focus and does 
not provide the immediate "benefit" abortion offers, I believe it 
is the more lasting one and the only one in which women will 
ever become truly free. 
